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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW - CRIMINAL PROCEDURE - RIGHT
TO COUNSEL - INDIGENT MISDEMEANOR DEFENDANT NOT
ENTITLED TO COURT-APPOINTED ATTORNEY UNLESS SEN-
TENCED TO ACTUAL CONFINEMENT. SCOTT v. ILLINOIS, 440
U.S. 367 (1979).
I. INTRODUCTION
In Scott v. Illinois,' the United States Supreme Court held, in a
five-to-four decision, that the sixth and fourteenth amendments do
not require a state to appoint counsel for an indigent2 defendant who
is prosecuted for a misdemeanor if the defendant is not sentenced to
actual confinement upon conviction. 3 The decision marks a halt of
the gradual expansion of the right to court-appointed counsel begun
by the Court in 1932, which by 1972 had resulted in the holding that
the sixth and fourteenth amendments entitle an indigent misde-
meanor defendant in a state criminal proceeding to court-appointed
counsel if conviction results in actual confinement.4 The Scott Court
refused to extend that right to indigent misdemeanor defendants
who are not sentenced to actual confinement following conviction,
even when imprisonment is an authorized punishment for the
offense. Thus, the actual sentence imposed, rather than the possibil-
ity of imprisonment, determines whether an indigent misdemeanor
defendant possesses a constitutional right to be represented by
counsel appointed by the court. This casenote examines the sound-
ness of the Scott decision in light of prior right to counsel cases and
discusses the practical effects of the decision as well as the questions
remaining after Scott.
II. THE FACTS
The defendant, Aubrey Scott, was charged with shoplifting,
punishable under the applicable Illinois theft statute by a five
1. 440 U.S. 367 (1979).
2. Definitions of "indigent" are numerous. Maryland defines it to mean "any
person taken into custody . .. who under oath or affirmation subscribes and
states in writing that he is financially unable, without undue hardship, to
provide for the full payment of an attorney and all other necessary expenses of
legal representation." MD. ANN. CODE art. 27A, § 2(f) (1976).
3. 440 U.S. 367, 369 (1979).
4. The expansion of the right to counsel began with Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S.
45 (1932), in which the Supreme Court held that fundamental fairness required
that indigent defendants charged with a capital offense be provided court-
appointed counsel. Forty years later in Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25
(1972), the Court held that an indigent charged with a misdemeanor and
sentenced to a 90-day jail sentence was entitled to be represented by counsel at
state expense.
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hundred dollar fine or one year in jail, or both.' Scott appeared in
court without counsel and stated he was ready for trial, waived his
right to a jury trial, and was subsequently found guilty by the
Illinois court and fined fifty dollars. Scott, an indigent,7 was not
advised of his right to counsel at any time during the proceeding. He
appealed his conviction, contending that under the sixth and
fourteenth amendments Illinois had been required to provide counsel
for him at state expense. The Illinois appellate court upheld Scott's
conviction." That decision was affirmed by both the Supreme Court of
Illinois9 and the United States Supreme Court. 0
III. THE RIGHT TO COURT-APPOINTED COUNSEL
The right to counsel in a criminal case is one of the many
guarantees afforded by the sixth amendment to the United States
Constitution." The portion of the amendment pertaining to the right
to counsel provides that "[iun all criminal prosecutions, the accused
shall enjoy the right to . . . the Assistance of Counsel for his
defence."' 2 The amendment does not explicitly guarantee a right to
court-appointed counsel to criminal defendants who are unable to
afford the cost of legal representation. The Supreme Court, however,
has recognized that such a right is implicitly guaranteed by the sixth
amendment.
The line of cases establishing the right to appointed counsel
began with Powell v. Alabama.3 In that case, nine indigent black
defendants were charged with rape, then a capital offense in
Alabama. 4 The Court held that in a capital case in which a
defendant is unable to employ counsel, and particularly when
characteristics such as ignorance, feeblemindedness, or illiteracy
5. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 16-1 (1971). The penalty provision of the statute states
in pertinent part: "A person first convicted of theft of property ... not
exceeding $150 in value shall be fined not to exceed $500 or imprisoned in a
penal institution . . . not to exceed one year, or both ... "
6. 440 U.S. 367, 368 (1979).
7. The Supreme Court of Illinois assumed Scott was an indigent at the time of
trial because he was an indigent at the time of his first appeal. There was
nothing in the record to show he was an indigent at trial. People v. Scott, 68 Ill.
2d 269, 271, 369 N.E.2d 881, 882 (1977).
8. People v. Scott, 36 Ill. App. 3d 304, 343 N.E.2d 517 (1976).
9. People v. Scott, 68 Ill. 2d 269, 369 N.E.2d 881 (1977).
10. Scott v. Illinois, 440 U.S. 367 (1979).
11. The sixth amendment to the United States Constitution also affords the
accused in a criminal prosecution the right to a speedy and public trial by an
impartial jury, to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation, to be
confronted with opposing witnesses, and to have compulsory process for
obtaining witnesses in his favor. U.S. CoNsT. amend. VI.
12. Id.
13. 287 U.S. 45 (1932).
14. These defendants are commonly referred to as the Scottsboro defendants. They
were charged with the rape of two white girls during a train ride.
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render the defendant helpless in defending himself, fundamental
fairness requires that court-appointed counsel be provided.,5
Although the Powell decision was limited to indigent defendants in
capital cases who were incapable of defending themselves, 6 portions
of the opinion stated that an intelligent layman might nonetheless
require the "guiding hand of counsel at every step in the proceedings
against him." 7
Six years later, in Johnson v. Zerbst,8 the Court relied heavily
on dictum in Powell to hold that the sixth amendment requires
federal courts to appoint counsel in all felony cases. 9 Subsequently,
in Betts v. Brady,20 the Court refused to apply Johnson to state felony
prosecutions, holding that the due process clause of the fourteenth
amendment does not incorporate the sixth amendment right to
counsel. The Betts majority held that the right to appointed counsel
was not a fundamental right essential to a fair trial in every state
felony prosecution.2' The Court stated that it would apply instead a
totality of the circumstances test on a case-by-case basis to
determine whether special circumstances existed 22 which would
indicate that the denial of counsel resulted in a fundamentally
unfair trial.
23
15. 287 U.S. 45, 71 (1932). The Powell Court guaranteed the Scottsboro defendants
the right to counsel on a fundamental fairness approach. In 1932, the
prevailing view was that the first ten amendments to the Constitution
(including the sixth amendment right to counsel) were only applicable to the
federal government. Barron v. Baltimore, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 243 (1833). The
theory of "incorporation" whereby the Bill of Rights was said to apply to the
states through the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment had not yet
been accepted. Thus, violations of the Bill of Rights at the state level were
grounds for reversal only if they resulted in a fundamentally unfair trial.
16. Powell involved other factors, such as public hostility toward the defendants
and the defendants' inability to communicate with friends and family, which
probably influenced the Court's decision. In addition, Alabama law required
court-appointed counsel for indigent defendants in a capital case. Powell v.
Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 48 (1932). The defendants actually were "appointed all
the members of the bar" just prior to trial, but this appointment could not be
considered as satisfying the right to counsel in any substantial way because the
opportunity for pretrial investigation and preparation is lost. Id. at 56-57.
17. Id. at 69.
18. 304 U.S. 458 (1938).
19. Because Johnson involved a federal prosecution, the sixth amendment directly
applied, and there was no need for the Court to look for fundamentally unfair
elements in the trial as the Court did in Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45 (1932).
20. 316 U.S. 455 (1942).
21. Id. at 471. The Court noted the informal nature of the non-jury trial, the fact
that there was no question whether a robbery was committed, and the maturity
and intelligence of the defendant as factors which suggested that the denial of
counsel in this case was not fundamentally unfair. Id. at 472.
22. The age and intelligence of the defendant are not the only special circum-
stances examined. In Gibbs v. Burke, 337 U.S. 773 (1949), inadmissible
hearsay and hostile, nonjudicial remarks from the bench were sufficient to
render the trial fundamentally unfair.
23. 316 U.S. 455, 471-73 (1942).
1980]
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In the years following the Betts decision, cases involving the
special circumstances requisite to a finding that the right to
court-appointed counsel exists were the rule rather than the
exception.24 Finally, in Gideon v. Wainwright,25 the Court overruled
Betts, admitting that it was "an abrupt break with its own
well-considered precedents. '26 Gideon was significant not only be-
cause it abrogated case-by-case analysis, but more importantly it
held that the denial of court-appointed counsel to indigent defen-
dants in a state felony prosecution is a violation of the sixth
amendment.27 Further, the Court held the amendment applicable to




Although Gideon assured an indigent defendant the right to a
court-appointed attorney in a state felony prosecution, confusion as
to whether an indigent defendant would enjoy that right in a state
misdemeanor prosecution continued. This confusion was caused not
24. See, e.g., Carnley v. Cochran, 369 U.S. 506 (1962) (illiterate defendant);
Chewning v. Cunningham, 368 U.S. 443 (1962) (complexity of issues); McNeal
v. Culver, 365 U.S. 109 (1961) (ignorant and mentally ill defendant); Hudson v.
North Carolina, 363 U.S. 697 (1960) (complexity of issues); Cash v. Culver, 358
U.S. 633 (1959) (uneducated defendant); Moore v. Michigan, 355 U.S. 155
(1957) (youthful and uneducated defendant); Palmer v. Ashe, 342 U.S. 134
(1951) (youth of defendant); Gibbs v. Burke, 337 U.S. 773 (1949) (gross
prejudicial evidentiary errors); Uveges v. Pennsylvania, 335 U.S. 437 (1948)
(youth of defendant); Townsend v. Burke, 334 U.S. 736 (1948) (submission of
erroneous information concerning prior record); Wade v. Mayo, 334 U.S. 672
(1948) (youth of defendant); Williams v. Kaiser, 323 U.S. 471 (1945)
(complexity of issues). But see, Gryger v. Burke, 334 U.S. 728 (1948)
(experienced four-time offender); Bute v. Illinois, 333 U.S. 640 (1948) (simple
language of indictment); Foster v. Illinois, 332 U.S. 134 (1947) (mature
defendant).
25. 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
26. Id. at 344.
27. Id.
28. Id. at 342. While the Gideon decision applied only the sixth amendment right to
counsel to the states, later decisions applied the other sixth amendment
guarantees to the states. See, e.g., Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145 (1968)
(right to jury trial); Washington v. Texas, 388 U.S. 14 (1967) (right to
compulsory process for obtaining witnesses); Klopfer v. North Carolina, 386
U.S. 213 (1967) (right to a speedy trial); Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400 (1965)
(right to confront opposing witnesses); In re Oliver, 333 U.S. 257 (1948) (right
to a public trial); Cole v. Arkansas, 333 U.S. 196 (1948) (right to notice of
charges). To date, all criminal rights in the first ten amendments of the United
States Constitution apply to the states with the exception of the eighth
amendment restraint on excessive bail, New York v. O'Neill, 359 U.S. 1 (1959)
(question on bail raised but not decided), and the fifth amendment requirement
for an indictment, Alexander v. Louisiana, 405 U.S. 625 (1972) (dicta citing
Hurtado v. California, 110 U.S. 516 (1884), which held that there is no state
requirement for indictment; Hurtado was decided before the trend toward
incorporation of the Bill of Rights into the fourteenth amendment).
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only by the factual setting of Gideon,"5 but also by the language in
later cases that referred to Gideon as specifically conferring the right
to counsel only in felony prosecutions. This confusion was partially
eliminated by the Supreme Court's decision in Argersinger v.
Hamlin.1 The defendant in Argersinger was charged with a
misdemeanor punishable by imprisonment of up to six months, a
thousand dollar fine, or both.3" He was not represented by counsel
and was ultimately convicted and sentenced to a ninety-day jail
term.33 The Supreme Court reversed the conviction, holding that
when a defendant is actually deprived of his personal liberty, even
upon misdemeanor conviction, denial of counsel is a violation of the
sixth amendment as applied to the states through the fourteenth
amendment. 34 Argersinger represents the high water mark in the
trend expanding the application of the right to court-appointed
counsel.
IV. SCOTT v. ILLINOIS
A. The Majority Opinion
The majority opinion in Scott, written by Justice Rehnquist,
declined to take the next step suggested by the trend of prior right to
counsel cases35 and decided that Scott was not entitled to counsel.
29. Gideon had broken into and entered a poolroom with the intent to commit a
misdemeanor. This constituted a non-capital felony under Florida law. 372 U.S.
335, 336-37 (1963).
30. See, e.g., McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759, 771 n.14 (1970); Brady v.
United States, 397 U.S. 742, 748 n.6 (1970); Mempha v. Rhay, 389 U.S. 128,
134 (1967).
31. 407 U.S. 25 (1972).
32. Id. at 26. Argersinger was charged with carrying a concealed weapon, a
misdemeanor under Florida law.
33. Id.
34. Id. at 37. Specifically, the Court stated that "absent a knowing and inielligent
waiver, no person may be imprisoned for any offense, whether classified as
petty, misdemeanor, or felony, unless he was represented by counsel at trial."
Id. In summarizing the decision, the Court noted, "[tihe run of misdemeanors
will not be affected by today's ruling. But in those that end up in the actual
deprivation of a person's liberty, the accused will receive the benefit of the
'guiding hand of counsel'...." Id. at 40. Despite the overall tone of the
decision which indicated the substantial need for counsel in any criminal
proceeding (whether imprisonment was actually imposed or only authorized),
this summary of the opinion clearly indicates that the right to counsel would
only be activated if actual confinement resulted upon conviction. Authorized or
possible confinement upon conviction for a misdemeanor was not yet sufficient
to guarantee the right to court-appointed counsel.
35. The line of cases begins with Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45 (1932), followed
by Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458 (1938), Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335
(1963), and the most recent decision prior to Scott, Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407
U.S. 25 (1972). Prior to Gideon, the right to counsel was guaranteed to state
indigent defendants on a fundamental fairness theory. After Gideon, the right




The majority utilized language in Argersinger36 to support its
holding that an indigent misdemeanor defendant is entitled to
court-appointed counsel only if actually confined upon conviction.37
Thus, the Court concluded that the constitutional right to court-
appointed counsel arises only when imprisonment is actually
imposed and not when imprisonment is merely authorized.
38
Under the actual imprisonment standard, an indigent is entitled
to court-appointed counsel only if he is actually confined upon
conviction. An authorized imprisonment standard, which was re-
jected by the Court, would have entitled an indigent to counsel
whenever imprisonment was authorized as punishment, even if the
defendant was not sentenced to confinement upon conviction. The
Court rejected Scott's contention that the Argersinger decision had
left open the question whether an indigent misdemeanor defendant
has a right to counsel when imprisonment is authorized but not
actually imposed. 39 The majority construed Argersinger to hold that
the states are required to "go only so far in furnishing counsel to
indigent defendants."4 This decision to draw the line for the right to
appointed counsel at the point of actual imprisonment was also
motivated by the Court's undocumented fear that extending Arger-
singer to cases in which imprisonment was merely authorized and
not imposed would create a substantial burden upon the states.4'
B. The Dissenting Opinion
In a lengthy dissent, Justice Brennan, joined by Justices
Marshall and Stevens, supported adoption of an authorized imprison-
ment standard as the constitutional guideline for the right to
appointed counsel.4" The dissent found this standard to be superior
for three reasons. First, an authorized imprisonment standard would
36. The language in Argersinger upon which the Stott majority relied stated that
"[tihe run of misdemeanors will not be affected by today's ruling. But in those
that end up in actual deprivation of a person's liberty, the accused will receive
the benefit of counsel." 440 U.S. 367, 370 (1979).
37. Id. at 374.
38. Id.
39. To support this contention, Scott referred the Court to language in Argersinger
which stated that the Court "need not consider the requirements of the Sixth
Amendment as regards the right to counsel where loss of liberty is not involved
' * * for here petitioner was in fact sentenced to jail." Id. at 370.
40. Id. at 369. The majority stated that to accept the petitioner's interpretation of
Argersinger, one would have to consider that decision as "a point in a moving
line." Id.
41. The Court noted the lack of extensive empirical data on the impact of
Argersinger, but after considering that some jurisdictions had difficulty
implementing Argersinger, the Court declined to create a further burden. Id. at
373-74 n.5.
42. Id. at 382 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Mr. Justice Blackmun also wrote a brief
dissenting opinion. See note 97 infra.
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more faithfully implement the principles of the sixth amendment as
expressed in Gideon." Second, it would eliminate the time-
consuming administrative procedure of predicting at the outset of
the trial whether a defendant will be imprisoned upon conviction to
determine if counsel is constitutionally required." Finally, the
dissent observed that the actual imprisonment standard would lead
judges to nullify legislative judgment because only punishment short
of actual confinement could be imposed if counsel had not been
provided for the indigent defendant.45 The dissent suggested that if
an authorized imprisonment standard was adopted, a trial judge
would have the option at the conclusion of trial to impose all possible
punishments for a misdemeanor, including imprisonment. 46 In
addition, the dissent noted that despite the majority's opinion, Scott
would have been entitled to counsel in thirty-three states47 and that
speculative fears concerning burdens on local governments should be
secondary to constitutional rights."
V. ANALYSIS
During the forty-year period between Powell and Argersinger,
the right to counsel underwent an evolutionary development that
resulted in a gradual increase in both the number of indigents who
were entitled to the assistance of counsel and the types of offenses to
which that right applied.49 This period of evolution existed because
the Supreme Court did not allow the doctrine of stare decisis to
prevent it from expanding application of the right to include less
serious offenses when the appropriate situation was presented.
50
43. 440 U.S. 367, 382 (1979) (Brennan, J., dissenting). Justice Brennan believed
that trials of offenses when imprisonment was a possibility possessed the same
potential for stigma and collateral consequences that the Gideon Court
contemplated when it extended the right to counsel to all state felony
prosecutions. Id.
44. Id. at 383. Justice Brennan disliked this procedure not only because it was time
consuming, but also because the system had problems of inaccurate predictions,
unequal treatment, and bias. Id. See Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25,
52-55 (1972) (Powell, J., concurring).
45. 440 U.S. 367, 383-84 (1979) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
46. Id. at 384 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
47. Id. at 388. If Scott had been a Maryland defendant, he would have been entitled
to a court-appointed attorney. See text accompanying notes 99-104 infra.
48. 440 U.S. 367, 384 (1979) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
49. In 1932, the right to court-appointed counsel was limited to intellectually
handicapped indigents in a capital case. Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45 (1932).
By 1972, the right had been held to extend to every indigent who was
sentenced to confinement upon a misdemeanor conviction. Argersinger v.
Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25 (1972).
50. See Herman & Thompson, Scott v. Illinois and the Right to Counsel: A Decision
in Search of a Doctrine?, 17 Am. CRIM. L. REV. 71, 77 (1979) [hereinafter cited as
Herman & Thompson]. In setting the stage for Scott, the Herman and
Thompson article notes that following Argersinger, some feared that the right
19801
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Thus, after Argersinger, commentators following the progression of
the right to counsel since Powell did not anticipate that this
constitutional evolution would cease, but rather, expected the right
would soon be accorded to indigents who were subject to imprison-
ment but not actually confined upon conviction.5' In Scott, however,
the Court refused to expand the right to counsel to include
misdemeanor charges not involving actual imprisonment and sug-
gested that Argersinger may have been the final step in the growth
of the sixth amendment right to counsel. This abrupt halt in the
expansion of the right is troublesome not only because it is contrary
to the theoretical development in previous right to counsel cases, but
also because numerous practical problems could arise when the Scott
standard is implemented by trial courts.
Except for the right to trial by jury, which has its own unique
development, 52 the right to counsel is the only sixth amendment
right which is not enjoyed by defendants in all criminal
prosecutions,5 3 as literal interpretation of the amendment would
demand. The inability of all defendants in all types of criminal
prosecutions to obtain court-appointed counsel is an unfortunate
to counsel would not expand beyond situations in which an indigent
misdemeanor defendant is sentenced to confinement upon conviction. As the
article states, however, "nothing in the antecedent development of the right to
counsel justified this fear. Powell v. Alabama did not result in limiting the
right to counsel to capital cases; Johnson v. Zerbst did not confine the right to
federal cases; and Gideon v. Wainwright did not restrict it to felony cases, as
Argersinger itself demonstrated." Id.
51. Id. Even critics of the Argersinger opinion recognized that the decision was
properly tailored to the facts of the case and that judicial restraint required
such a holding. Thus, it was believed Argersinger had continued the evolution
of the right to counsel and the question remaining after Argersinger "was not
whether the right to counsel would continue to grow, but to what class of
misdemeanor cases, not involving actual confinement, the Court would next
extend the right." Id.
52. The sixth amendment right to trial by jury was held applicable to the states in
Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145 (1968). The Court recognized in Duncan,
however, and continues to recognize today, that "there is a category of petty
crimes or offenses which is not subject to the Sixth Amendment jury trial
provision and should not be subject to the Fourteenth Amendment jury trial
requirement . . . applied to the States." Id. at 159. Crimes which carry
penalties of up to six months imprisonment do not require trial by jury. All
offenses that carry a potential imprisonment in excess of six months, however,
are not "petty" and require the guarantee of a jury trial. Baldwin v. New York,
399 U.S. 66 (1970). Thus, unlike the right to counsel, the right to trial by jury
is activated by the authorized penalty.
53. The sixth amendment to the United States Constitution states that in "all
criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the. . . Assistance of Counsel."
The amendment also guarantees the accused the right to a speedy and public
trial, the right to trial by jury, the right to notice of the charges, the right to
confrontation, and the right to compulsory process for obtaining witnesses. U.S.
CONST. amend. VI. Thus, if the right is guaranteed to the accused in a
doctrinally pure sense, the type of criminal offense should not determine
whether the right is granted to the defendant, be it a felony or a misdemeanor.
460 [Vol. 9
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aspect of our criminal justice system and persists notwithstanding a
general consensus that, in the absence of counsel, the ability to
exercise other rights is seriously impaired.5 4 Until Scott, the right to
counsel had been gradually approaching a doctrinally pure inter-
pretation of the sixth amendment, which would require that all
defendants in all criminal prosecutions be entitled to court-appointed
counsel. Scott thus portends an end of a period of what was already
painfully slow evolutionary growth of a constitutional right.
55
Notwithstanding foreshadowings of an imminent decision estab-
lishing a right to counsel in all criminal prosecutions as early as
1932 in Powell v. Alabama,6 it was not until recently in Gideon and
Argersinger, respectively, that the sixth amendment was held to
afford a right to court-appointed counsel to all state felony defend-
ants and those non-felony defendants who were sentenced to
imprisonment.57 Even these decisions, however, fell short of giving
the sixth amendment a literal interpretation by applying it to all
criminal prosecutions.
As the number and types of offenses to which the right to
counsel was held applicable increased, it appeared that courts were
moving toward acceptance of the doctrinally pure interpretation of
the sixth amendment, thereby making the "guiding hand of counsel"
available to every defendant in all criminal prosecutions. This
decision appeared even more inevitable as courts began to take
notice of the increasing number of lawyers available to represent
54. The Supreme Court itself has referred to the assistance of counsel as the
principal sixth amendment right which allows the defendant to assert other
sixth amendment guarantees to the fullest. See Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S.
45, 68-69 (1932). Cf. Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 344 (1963) (the
Court indicated that representation by counsel was a necessity, not a luxury).
In 1956, a member of the Supreme Court of Illinois, the same court that
affirmed Scott's denial of counsel, stated that "of all the rights that an accused
person has, the right to be represented by counsel is by far the most pervasive,
for it affects his ability to assert any other rights he may have." Shaefer,
Federalism and State Criminal Procedure, 70 HARV. L. REV. 1, 8 (1956).
55. The sixth amendment was ratified in 1791, but it was not until 1963 that the
right to counsel was held applicable to the states. Gideon v. Wainwright,
372 U.S. 335 (1963).
56. 287 U.S. 45 (1932). At one point in Powell, Justice Sutherland stated that"even the intelligent and educated layman has small and sometimes no skill in
the science of law .... He requires the guiding hand of counsel at every step
in the proceedings against him." Id. at 69. As one commentator has noted, this
sweeping language could have stood for the principle that "counsel must be
appointed in virtually all criminal cases if indigents are to have a fair
hearing." W. BEANEY, THE RIGHT TO COUNSEL IN AMERICAN COURTS 155 (1955).
57. Although the right to counsel was recognized prior to Gideon, it was not until
Gideon that the sixth amendment was recognized as the basis of the right.
Prior to Gideon, the right to counsel was founded upon a fundamental fairness
or due process approach. In Argersinger, the Court used the sixth amendment
as the basis for its decision to expand the right to counsel to indigent




indigent defendants.58 Scott, however, disregarded this trend by
holding that a defendant in a misdemeanor prosecution is not
entitled to court-appointed counsel unless he is sentenced to actual
confinement. The Scott decision, in effect, conditions the fairness of a
defendant's trial upon the type of punishment he is likely to receive.
Previous cases suggest that such a distinction is unconstitutional. 9
In addition, use of an actual imprisonment standard not only
disregards serious collateral consequences that arise from a misde-
meanor conviction, but also creates substantial practical difficulties
in implementation.
For example, for purposes of the initial decision as to whether a
defendant is constitutionally entitled to appointed counsel, Scott
places a trial judge in the awkward position of determining before
trial begins whether imprisonment is likely upon conviction."0
Ideally, if confinement is a strong possibility, counsel will be
appointed. Conversely, if imprisonment appears unlikely, the trial
judge is not required to appoint counsel. Making a decision as to
punishment before the introduction of evidence, however, necessarily
produces serious problems. One potential problem arises when a
judge initially determines that imprisonment is a strong possibility,
appoints counsel for an indigent defendant, and, subsequent to trial,
sentences the defendant to actual confinement. Even if the evidence
were to support the conviction and sentence imposed, the sentence
could nonetheless be attacked on the ground that it resulted from
58. As Justice Douglas noted in Argersinger, only 2,300 full-time counsel would be
required to represent all misdemeanor defendants, while an estimated 355,200
attorneys were licensed in the United States. Additionally, the latter figure
was expected to double by 1985. Id. at 37 n.7.
59. In Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956), the Court held that it was a denial of
equal protection to refuse to provide an imprisoned indigent with a transcript
of his criminal trial for appeal purposes. In Mayer v. Chicago, 404 U.S. 189
(1972), the Griffin decision was the basis for providing a transcript to an
indigent who only received a fine upon conviction. Thus, if the imprisonment-
nonimprisonment line is invalid for purposes of obtaining a transcript, it is
difficult to understand why the same distinction is valid when denying
appointed counsel.
60. As noted by Justice Goldenhersh of the Illinois court:
The majority quotes that portion of Argersinger which endows the
courts with a degree of prescience which I doubt exists, that is, that a
judge prior to hearing any evidence, "will have a measure of the
seriousness and gravity of the offense and therefore know when to name
a lawyer to represent the accused before the trial starts." I have
searched Argersinger in vain for the source of this knowledge prior to
the time when a judge has heard evidence in the case.




prejudice formulated during the pretrial determination.6' A sentence
of confinement would be particularly vulnerable to attack following
a non-jury trial because the same judge who is privy to information
concerning the defendant's prior record and circumstances surround-
ing his trial must also make an unbiased determination of the facts
of the case.2 Although the ability of judges to determine fairly the
outcome of a case under similar circumstances has not been
questioned,' the possibility that such prejudicial information will
actually taint the outcome of a trial should not be easily dismissed. 4
Even when the evidence proves that a judge's predetermination
of a defendant's candidacy for imprisonment *was correct, such a
procedure is subject to criticism because of the increased costs that a
predetermination procedure is likely to require. In order to conduct a
predetermination procedure in a manner that will avoid error,
localities should develop a more formal approach than presently
exists to ensure a correct pretrial punishment determination. This
more formalistic approach will most likely require additional court
personnel and an inevitable new economic burden upon the states.'
Ironically, if such formal procedures were to develop, Scott will have
resulted in imposing a new burden upon state court systems
notwithstanding that avoidance of increased fiscal burdens upon
state courts was one rationale relied upon by the Court to support
61. See Duke, The Right to Appointed Counsel: Argersinger and Beyond, 12 AM.
CRIM. L. REV. 601, 612 (1975). The author states:
[If a judge determines that jail is a likelihood upon conviction and
therefore appoints counsel, a subsequent jail sentence will appear to
have been the product of a pre-trial determination and not the result of
what the evidence, tested at trial, disclosed. This would cast doubt on
the impartiality of the judge.
62. S. KRANTZ, RIGHT TO COUNSEL IN CRIMINAL CASES 87 (1976).
63. United States v. Bowles, 428 F.2d 592 (2d Cir. 1970). In Bowles, the defendant
contended that it was prejudicial error for the judge, who heard and denied a
pretrial motion to suppress evidence, to preside at his trial. The court of
appeals rejected the defendant's contention and held that the trial judge is
sufficiently disciplined to exclude hearsay evidence when making a final
determination. Id. at 594. Similarly, in Webster v. United States, 330 F. Supp.
1080 (E.D. Va. 1971), the court noted that much information concerning the
defendant and the facts of the case is ordinarily imparted to the judge in
various pretrial proceedings, but this alone does not disqualify the judge from
hearing the case. Id. at 1086.
64. See Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25, 42-43 (1972) (Burger, C.J.,
concurring). The Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure recognize that pretrial
information could prejudice the outcome of a trial. For example, Rule 32 (c)(1)
states that a presentence report shall not be submitted to the court unless the
defendant has pleaded guilty or has been found guilty. Commenting on the
rule, the Supreme Court noted in Gregg v. United States, 394 U.S. 489 (1969),
that permitting ex parte material of this nature to reach the judge would
"seriously contravene the rule's purpose of preventing possible prejudice." Id. at
492.
65. See generally S. KRANTZ, RIGHT TO COUNSEL IN CRIMINAL CASES 83-86 (1976).
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the decision not to extend the right to counsel to all misdemeanor
defendants.
66
An even more serious potential problem with pretrial sentencing
determinations arises when a trial judge decides that imprisonment
would be unlikely in a particular case and does not appoint counsel,
but after hearing the evidence at trial, determines that incarceration
would not only have been the preferable sanction, but is also
seriously needed. To impose a sentence under such circumstances,
however, would be constitutionally prohibited because the defendant
was not represented by counsel, and any attempt to impose a
sentence would certainly be reversed on appeal on the basis of Scott.
Trial judges, in such situations, will be forced to seek alternative
methods to achieve the desired result. For example, one possibility
would be to declare a mistrial, and retry the defendant when counsel
has been appointed. Constitutional case law, however, suggests that
declaring a mistrial in order to enable the prosecution to try the
defendant with the possibility of imposing a harsher sentence would
violate the ban on double jeopardy.67 Traditionally, a mistrial and
subsequent retrial have been used sparingly,68 and granting a mistrial
solely to allow the state a second chance at prosecution, with an
increased possibility of conviction, is improper.69
Notwithstanding the practical problems associated with a
pretrial determination as to whether imprisonment is likely upon
conviction, the Scott case also fails to explain what constitutes "actual
imprisonment." The Supreme Court not only neglected to explain
this ambiguous term, but it added to the confusion by using other
language which suggests that Scott requires actual sentencing to
66. Scott v. Illinois, 440 U.S. 367, 375 (1979). There is also the possibility that a
lengthy pretrial determination for indigent defendants, but no such process for
non-indigent defendants, could create an equal protection violation. To avoid
the anomalous results of individual defendant predetermination, the Scott
mandate could also be implemented by predicting punishment and thus
providing counsel on a class of offense standard. S. KRANTZ, RIGHT TO COUNSEL IN
CRIMINAL CASES 90 (1976). Under this process, indigents charged with
misdemeanors that traditionally call for jail terms would be afforded counsel
whereas those indigent misdemeanants charged with minor offenses that do
not traditionally warrant a jail sentence would not be appointed counsel. Such
a procedure, however, would wrongly allow the courts to disregard the
punishment deemed appropriate for a misdemeanor. Id.
67. This scenario was contemplated by Justice Powell in his concurring opinion in
Argersinger, 407 U.S. 25, 54 (1972), and similar concerns are expressed in S.
KRANTZ, RIGHT TO COUNSEL IN CRIMINAL CASES 75 (1976).
68. The Supreme Court has held that a retrial is usually only allowed when the
defendant is benefited. Gori v. United States, 367 U.S. 364 (1961). Although
this "benefited" standard has been rejected, the Supreme Court still only allows
mistrials and retrials if an impartial verdict could not be reached or a
procedural error would result in reversal of a valid verdict. See Illinois v.




confinement as opposed to actual imprisonment. 0 As a result of this
ambiguity, the question arises whether the right to counsel must be
provided whenever the indigent misdemeanant is sentenced to
confinement or if counsel is only required for those indigents who are
actually incarcerated after sentencing.7' For example, consider the
indigent defendant who is sentenced to confinement but whose
sentence is immediately suspended for a period of probation.
Technically, the defendant was sentenced to imprisonment which
would invoke the defendant's right to counsel if Scott means that
counsel must be provided whenever an indigent is actually sentenced
to confinement. If the Supreme Court intended, however, that
counsel be provided only to indigents who are actually incarcerated
after sentencing, the indigent who receives a suspended sentence
and probation would not be entitled to counsel under Scott. Because
most of the Scott opinion used the term "actual imprisonment," and
the Court indicated that Argersinger - which held that counsel is
required when conviction results in "actual deprivation of a person's
liberty" - is the constitutional limit for the right to counsel,72 the
Supreme Court probably intended that counsel need be provided only
when the defendant's conviction leads to his actual incarceration.
When deciding a case concerning a right as fundamental as the right
to counsel, the Supreme Court should carefully and clearly establish
when legal representation is required so that states may implement
these constitutional guidelines with the least possible confusion.
Even if one assumes that the Supreme Court intended that an
indigent misdemeanant has the right to counsel only when actually
incarcerated, a further question is raised regarding what constitutes
incarceration. For example, suppose an indigent charged with a
misdemeanor is unable to make bail and ultimately receives
probation at trial. In this situation, his incarceration prior to trial
could constitute the requisite actual confinement necessary to invoke
the right to counsel or, more likely, the Supreme Court would assert
that because there was no sentencing to confinement, no right to
counsel arises. Suppose, however, that a defendant cannot make bail
70. Throughout most of the opinion, the Court refers to the standard as actual
imprisonment, but at the end of the opinion states, "[W]e therefore hold that
the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution
require only that no indigent criminal defendant be sentenced to a term of
imprisonment unless the State has afforded him the right to assistance of
appointed counsel in his defense." Scott v. Illinois, 440 U.S. 367, 373-74 (1979).
71. Recently, the Court indicated that Scott "held that an uncounseled misde-
meanor conviction is constitutionally valid if the offender is not incarcerated."
Baldasar v. Illinois, 48 U.S.L.W. 4481, 4481 (U.S. 1980) (per curiam) (emphasis
added).
72. 440 U.S. 367, 369 (1979). Rather than view Argersinger as "a point in a moving
line," the Court chose to view it as a "holding that the States are required to go
only so far in furnishing counsel to indigent defendants." Id.
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and is subsequently sentenced only to that time during which he was
incarcerated prior to trial. In this situation, the defendant has been
both actually sentenced and actually confined, and thus it would
seem logical, even under Scott, that the court is required to provide
counsel. Situations such as these demonstrate the lack of clarity and
probable confusion that will result when the actual imprisonment
standard of Scott is applied in the future by state courts.
The decision in Scott to draw the constitutional line for the right
to counsel at misdemeanors resulting in actual confinement disre-
gards the serious collateral consequences that can result from
misdemeanor convictions.73 Upon conviction, the misdemeanant may
lose many privileges which will have a devastating effect upon his
ability to return to society as a normal citizen. Aside from the stigma
which inherently attaches upon conviction, the misdemeanant
seeking employment in the private sector is automatically disqual-
ified from many positions74 and is confronted with widespread
discrimination by employers for the openings that remain.75 Employ-
ment possibilities for the ex-misdemeanant in the civil service field
are also limited. Although certain government positions may be
73. In Illinois, a theft conviction may be used under an enhanced penalty statute to
convert a subsequent misdemeanor into a felony with a prison term. Recently,
however, in Baldasar v. Illinois, 48 U.S.L.W. 4481 (U.S. 1980), the Supreme
Court held that an uncounseled misdemeanor conviction could not be used by
the state to support an enhanced penalty for a subsequent misdemeanor.
Although Baldasar was a per curiam decision, there were four separate
opinions. In the major concurring opinion, Justice Marshall concluded that
imprisonment imposed as a result of the enhanced penalty statute arose from
the first uncounseled misdemeanor conviction and thus violated the actual
imprisonment standard of Scott. Id. at 4482. In dissent, Justice Powell believed
that the sentence imposed under the enhanced penalty statute was "solely a
penalty" for the second offense and thus that there was no violation of Scott.
Powell also believed that the Baldasar decision would further confuse and
burden local courts. Id. at 4483-84.
74. See Collateral Consequences of a Criminal Conviction, 23 VAND. L. REV 929,
1001 (1970). This special project investigating the lasting effects of a criminal
conviction notes that most fidelity insurance companies refuse to bond
individuals who have been convicted of a criminal offense and consequently the
offender is automatically disqualified for employment in positions that require
bonding. Id. Justice Brennan also notes in his dissent that Scott's conviction for
theft would bar him from working in any capacity in a bank insured by FDIC
or possibly in any public or private employment requiring a security clearance.
Scott v. Illinois, 440 U.S. 367, 380-81 n.10 (Brennan, J., dissenting). In
Maryland, while there is normally no duty on the part of the employer to
inquire about an employee's possible criminal record, the employer could be
liable for the employee's acts under a negligent hiring theory if he was aware of
the employee's criminal record but decided to hire him for a position in which
the employee would be in contact with the public. See Evans v. Morsell, 284
Md. 160, 395 A.2d 480 (1978).
75. A private employer's refusal to hire a job applicant because of his arrest record
has been held to be a violation of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. See Gregory v.
Litton Systems, Inc., 316 F. Supp. 401 (C.D. Cal. 1970). Nevertheless, private
discrimination and prejudice remains.
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available for those convicted of minor criminal offenses,7 6 the
decision to employ such an applicant is often within the discretion of
the agency, and studies indicate that few ex-offenders are actually
hired." Particularly burdened by a misdemeanor conviction are
those defendants whose present or intended occupation is licensed by
a state or municipal agency. 78 Many licensed occupations list
conviction of a crime as a ground for revocation of the license, and
often the ultimate decision is made by administrative boards which
do not afford the misdemeanant the pervasive rights he enjoyed at
his criminal trial.
79
In addition to these barriers affecting the defendant's immediate
financial recovery, a criminal conviction may preclude the offender
from participating in insurance, pension, and workmen's compensa-
tion programs.80 A misdemeanor conviction could also involve the
loss of certain judicial rights, such as the right to serve as a juror a8
the capacity to testify as a witness at a trial,82 and the ability to
76. Collateral Consequences of a Criminal Conviction, 23 VAND. L. REV. 929, 1014
(1970). For example, typical public employees include matrons, janitors, and
park attendants. Id.
77. Id.
78. In Illinois, this included a large number of employment possibilities. A theft
conviction in Illinois could result in disqualification for twelve occupations
under state law and twenty-three occupations under Chicago ordinances which
require "good moral character" or some similar background qualification. Scott
v. Illinois, 440 U.S. 367, 380-81 n.10 (1979) (Brennan, J., dissenting). In
Maryland, conviction for any crime involving moral turpitude can also lead to
the revocation of occupational licenses, such as those for nursing. See MD. ANN.
CODE art. 43, § 299(11) (1980).
79. Collateral Consequences of a Criminal Conviction, 23 VAND. L. REV. 929, 1005
(1970). Although notice, hearing, and reason for revocation are usually
required, licensing authority actions are exclusively administrative and review
on the merits may be refused. Id.
80. Id. at 1109-40.
81. Illinois state law requires jurors to be of "fair character" and "approved
integrity." ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 78, § 2 (1975). As a result, Scott may be excluded
from jury duty because of his theft conviction. Scott v. Illinois, 440 U.S. 367,
380-81 n.10 (1979) (Brennan, J., dissenting). In Maryland, a person is
disqualified to serve as a juror if he "[hias a charge pending against him for a
crime punishable by a fine of $500 or more, or by imprisonment for more than
six months, or both, or has been convicted of such a crime and has received a
sentence of a fine of $500 or more, or of imprisonment for more than six
months, or both, and has not been pardoned." MD. CTS. & JUD. PROC. CODE ANN.
§ 8-207(6)(5) (1980).
82. People v. Stufflebean, 24 Ill. App. 3d 1065, 1068-69, 322 N.E.2d 488, 491-92
(1974), cited by Justice Brennan in his dissent. Note, however, that in
Maryland only a person convicted of perjury may not testify. Mn. CTS. & JUD.
PRoc. CODE ANN. § 9-104 (1980). As to other individuals, a prior conviction
would affect merely the credibility, and not the admissibility of his testimony.
See generally Taylor v. State, 278 Md. 150, 360 A.2d 430 (1976); Mason v.
State, 242 Md. 707, 218 A.2d 682 (1966).
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serve as a court-appointed fiduciary.13 Upon conviction, misde-
meanants may also lose the right to vote,8 and alien defendants who
are convicted may suffer special consequences." The collateral effects
of a misdemeanor conviction may also result in numerous problems
in domestic situations, including disadvantages upon divorce and in
custody battles. 6 At the very least, a misdemeanor conviction will
almost always result in a fine, which usually will, be devastating to
the indigent defendant."7 Thus, the Scott decision to limit the right to
counsel to those indigent defendants actually imprisoned leaves
many other indigents to face misdemeanor trials without counsel
even though serious collateral consequences will almost surely occur
upon conviction.
In light of the shortcomings of the actual imprisonment
standard adopted in Scott, future Supreme Court decisions concern-
ing the right to appointed counsel may seek an alternative standard.
One such alternative would be to grant indigent defendants the right
to counsel in all criminal prosecutions."" Under such a standard, an
indigent would have the right to appointed counsel in any criminal
prosecution, regardless of the seriousness of the offense. This
alternative is appealing for two basic reasons. First, it would
implement the exact mandate of the sixth amendment. Second, the
'tall prosecutions" standard would be the easiest to administer at the
trial level.89 While this alternative is appealing because of its
doctrinal purity and simplicity, the likelihood that the Supreme
Court will adopt such an approach in the near future is remote.
83. See Collateral Consequences of a Criminal Conviction, 23 VAND. L. REV.
929, 1059-64 (1970). This would include the possible loss of capacity to serve as
an executor, administrator, guardian, or trustee. Id.
84. Id. at 974.
85. Id. at 970. Persons who are not citizens of the United States may be ineligible
to become naturalized citizens or subject to deportation if convicted.
86. Id. at 1064. Although restrictions and difficulties in the domestic area usually
only arise in cases involving serious crimes, any criminal conviction may be
determinative when custody is at issue.
87. Cf Mayer v. Chicago, 404 U.S. 189 (1971) (a five hundred dollar fine imposed
upon an indigent was held to be so burdensome that it was sufficient to entitle
the defendant to the constitutional right to a free transcript for appeal
purposes).
88. U.S. CONST. amend. VI. In pertinent part, the amendment provides that "in all
criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to ... the Assistance
of Counsel for his defence." Note that this alternative leaves open the difficult
question of what constitues a "criminal prosecution." See Herman & Thompson,
supra note 50, at 78.
89. In Argersinger, Justice Powell, while not advocating this standard, did admit
that its simplicity was appealing. 407 U.S. 25, 50-51 (1972).
[Vol. 9
Scott v. Illinois
One reason for the slow expansion of the right to counsel was
fear of the increased burdens state courts would suffer.90 If the
Supreme Court were to grant a sweeping extension of the sixth
amendment right to counsel to all indigent defendants, the fear was
that state courts could not readily absorb the increased burden. One
possibility for alleviating such a potential burden might be to
remove minor offenses such as drunkenness and vagrancy from the
ambit of "criminal prosecutions." 91
A second alternative is the authorized imprisonment standard
suggested by Justice Brennan in his dissenting opinion in Scott.
92
Under this standard, counsel would be appointed for all indigent
defendants charged with any felony or misdemeanor for which
imprisonment is an authorized sentence.9 3 Although this alternative
is not doctrinally pure,9' there are a number of features which make
the authorized standard attractive as well as the most logical choice
for the Supreme Court in future right to counsel cases.
One attractive feature of the authorized imprisonment standard
is that it eliminates the problems inherent in prejudging a
defendant's punishment upon conviction that arise under the actual
imprisonment standard. As Justice Brennan noted in his dissent, the
authorized imprisonment standard "avoids the necessity for time-
consuming consideration of the likely sentence in each individual
case before trial and the attendant problems of inaccurate predic-
tions, unequal treatment, and apparent and actual bias."95 That the
authorized imprisonment standard would also be a logical future
choice by courts is evidenced by the fact that a number of states
began to work under this standard in the wake of Argersinger and
continue to do so today. Thus, the majority's decision to reject an
authorized imprisonment standard in favor of an actual imprison-
ment standard ignored the successful operation in the thirty-three
90. One study estimated that over 200,000 indigent defendants will require counsel
for felony prosecutions alone. To include all misdemeanants (traffic offenses as
well as normal misdemeanors) would involve another 13.5 million indigent
offenders who would be eligible for state-appointed counsel. Note, Dollars and
Sense of an Expanded Right to Counsel, 55 IOWA L. REV. 1249, 1263 (1970).
91. See Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25, 38 n.9 (1972).
92. 440 U.S. 367, 382 (1979).
93. As one commentary stated:
Under the authorized imprisonment alternative, the statutorily per-
missible sentence would control the right to appointed counsel,
regardless of the sentence actually imposed. Thus, if the authorized
punishment included confinement for any period, the indigent would be
entitled to counsel.
Herman & Thompson, supra note 50, at 79.
94. The authorized imprisonment standard would entitle more indigent misde-
meanants to appointed counsel, but it would nonetheless not provide this right
to all defendants in all criminal prosecutions.
95. 440 U.S. 367, 383 (1979) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
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states that provide legal assistance to all indigents who face criminal
prosecutions for which imprisonment is an authorized punishment.'
It is difficult to predict with certainty which, if any, of these
alternatives future Supreme Court right to appointed counsel cases
will adopt.97 It is interesting to note, however, that the Scott decision
was decided by a mere five-to-four majority with Justice Powell
providing the decisive vote in a concurring opinion based upon stare
decisis.9 8 In light of this delicate balance of opinion among members
of the present Court, the prospect for change in subsequent decisions
is a strong possibility.
VI. THE IMPACT OF SCOTT IN MARYLAND
Although the actual confinement standard of Scott may deny
many indigents the right to counsel in jurisdictions which provide
legal representation only when constitutionally required, few indi-
gent misdemeanants facing trial in Maryland will be denied
appointed counsel as a result of Scott. The Maryland Public Defender
statute provides that indigent defendants must be provided legal
representation in any criminal proceeding "constitutionally requir-
ing the presence of counsel prior to presentment before a commis-
sioner or judge."99 In addition to providing legal representation when
constitutionally required," Maryland also requires that counsel be
provided for any indigent who is charged with a misdemeanor
96. Id. at 388. (Brennan, J., dissenting).
97. It should also be noted that in a separate dissenting opinion in Scott, Mr.
Justice Blackmun suggested another alternative whereby an indigent "must be
afforded appointed counsel whenever the defendant is prosecuted for a
non-petty criminal offense, that is one punishable by more than six months'
imprisonment,. . . or whenever the defendant is convicted of an offense and is
actually subjected to a term of imprisonment." Scott v. Illinois, 440 U.S. 367,
389-90 (1979) (Blackmun, J., dissenting). Justice Blackmun has recently
suggested this alternative again in Baldasar v. Illinois, 48 U.S.L.W. 4481 (U.S.
1980). Another alternative would be to provide counsel for all indigent
defendants facing serious misdemeanors, but for defendants charged with petty
offenses, the right to counsel would only attach if special circumstances
warranted. Herman & Thompson, supra note 50, at 81-82. Such alternatives,
however, not only suggest equal protection problems, but they also create the
problem of defining "serious," "petty," and "special circumstances."
98. Scott v. Illinois, 440 U.S. 367, 374 (1979). Justice Powell reiterated his
reservations about the Argersinger rule but believed that some guideline had to
be given to lower courts across the nation. Id.
99. MD. ANN. CODE art. 27A, § 4(b)(1) (Supp. 1979).
100. Following Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25 (1972), the court of special
appeals noted that the classification of an offense as a "felony" or a "serious
crime," which had served as the criterion for the right to appointed counsel for
the indigent, was unconstitutional. As a result of Argersinger, the indigent was
now constitutionally required to have counsel whenever he was deprived of his




punishable by more than three months confinement or a fine of more
than five hundred dollars."1
Although Maryland does not provide counsel in all cases where
any imprisonment is authorized, the statutory mandate to provide
counsel when confinement for more than three months is authorized
affords greater protection than constitutionally required by Scott. It
should be noted, however, that while the Maryland standard assures
the accused indigent legal representation for most misdemeanor
offenses, there are some classes of misdemeanors for which legal
representation is not required.0 2 In these cases, the indigent would
only be entitled to counsel under the less inclusive actual confine-
ment standard of Scott. For example, an indigent charged with
unlawful picketing in Maryland is subject to a one hundred dollar
fine or imprisonment for not more than ninety days if convicted.
0 3
Assuming counsel is not provided under the discretionary power of
the court,' °4 the indigent is not eligible for legal representation under
the authorized standard applied in Maryland because the term of
possible confinement for unlawful picketing does not exceed three
months. Consequently, counsel would only be provided for this
indigent were he to be actually confined upon conviction. Thus, in
the majority of misdemeanor cases, the Maryland indigent is
afforded the right to counsel in more situations than is constitu-
tionally required under Scott. In those cases in which the authorized
punishment for a misdemeanor does not place it within the
protection of the Maryland authorized standard, however, the Scott
standard of actual confinement will determine whether the indigent
is provided counsel.
VIi. CONCLUSION
The Scott decision represents a halt to the gradual expansion of
the right to appointed counsel. Future decisions will determine if
Scott was a temporary delay or a permanent limitation on this sixth
amendment right. Whatever later decisions hold, it is clear that, at
101. MD. ANN. CODE art. 27A, § 2(g)(2) (1976).
102. See, e.g., MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 469 (1976 & Supp. 1979) (maintenance of
junkyard or automobile graveyard in violation of natural resources laws); MD.
ANN. CODE art. 27, § 556 (1976) (disclosure of private communication by person
connected with telegraph or telephone company); MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 580
(1976) (trespass for purpose of invading privacy by looking into window or
door).
103. MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 580A (1976). Portions of this statute were held
unconstitutional in State v. Schuller, 280 Md. 305, 372 A.2d 1076 (1977).
104. In Maryland, an indigent charged with a misdemeanor may be provided counsel
if, in the opinion of the court, either the complexity of the case ok some
characteristic of the individual, such as his youth, inexperience, or mental
capacity, requires that counsel be appointed. MD. ANN. CODE art. 27A, § 2(h)(2)
(1976). This section is similar to the special circumstances test of Betts v.
Brady, 316 U.S. 455 (1942).
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least for the present, the type of defense that some misdemeanor
defendants will be able to produce unfortunately will depend upon
their financial resources.
Michael E. Cross
